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It has been suggested that evaluative normativity should be expunged from the psychology
of reasoning. A broadly Davidsonian response to these arguments is presented. It is
suggested that two distinctions, between different types of rationality, aremore permeable
than this argument requires and that the fundamental objection is to selecting theories that
make the most rational sense of the data. It is argued that this is inevitable consequence of
radical interpretation where understanding others requires assuming they share our own
norms of reasoning.This requires evaluative normativity and it is shown that when asked to
evaluate others’ arguments participants conform to rational Bayesian norms. It is suggested
that logic and probability are not in competition and that the variety of norms is more limited
than the arguments against evaluative normativity suppose. Moreover, the universality of
belief ascription suggests that many of our norms are universal and hence evaluative. It
is concluded that the union of evaluative normativity and descriptive psychology implicit in
Davidson and apparent in the psychology of reasoning is a good thing.
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Elqayam and Evans (2011) have argued against evaluative nor-
mativity having any role in psychological theories of reasoning.
They contrast evaluative normativity with directive normativity.
They argue that directive normativity is conditional and per-
fectly consistent with programs in cognitive science like rational
analysis (Anderson, 1990; Oaksford and Chater, 1998, 2007). Con-
sequently, they have no problem with formulations like, if you
want to be well adapted to your environment then you should act in
a Bayes optimum fashion in classiﬁcation, decision and prediction.
However, what we can’t apparently assert is the unconditional you
should act in a Bayes optimum fashion in classiﬁcation, decision, and
prediction. This is an evaluative claim suggesting in some abso-
lute sense that this is the right way to behave. In particular, they
observe that if there were an alternative normative theory of what
constitutes being well adapted to your environment, citing empir-
ical evidence to distinguish between these two normative theories
would commit the is-ought fallacy. Consequently, evaluative nor-
mativity should be expunged from psychological theorizing about
reasoning.
In this paper, I pursue a broadly Davidsonian (Davidson, 2004)
response to Elqayam and Evans’ (2011). In the ﬁrst section, Types
of Rationality, I set up the argument by observing that two distinc-
tions they make, between instrumental and normative rationality
and between directive and evaluative rationality, are far more per-
meable than they require. I conclude that Elqayam and Evans
(2011) primary objection is to the suggestion that we should pick
the theory that makes the most rational sense of our data. In the
second section, Interpretation, Argumentation, and Rationality, I
argue that this is inevitable consequence of Davidson’s account of
radical interpretation. On Davidson’s view, rationality is a social
construct where to interpret others’ statements requires that we
adopt a principle of charity, i.e., they share the same norms as
ourselves. Davidson’s account suggests attributing people with
intentional states like beliefs requires evaluative normativity. I
then show that in the social context of argumentation, a third
person argument evaluation methodology yields close confor-
mity to rational Bayesian norms. Participants are quite capable
of evaluating others arguments. I conclude that this ubiquitous
human behavior is something that psychology must explain. In
the ﬁnal section, How Many Rational Norms Are There? I argue
that logic and probability theory are not really competing norms,
the important psychological question is whether beliefs are binary
or graded. Moreover, following Davidson, I question Elqayam and
Evans (2011) grounds for normative relativism. In conclusion,
I suggest that while there are many outstanding problems and
exceptions, the continuing union of evaluative normativity and
descriptive psychology apparent in the psychology of reasoning is
a good thing.
TYPES OF RATIONALITY
Stanovich (2011) argued that Elqayam and Evans (2011) drive
a wedge between Bayesian probability theory, which they regard
as an account of normative rationality, and instrumental ratio-
nality. Instrumental or practical rationality, which Elqayam and
Evans (2011) endorse, provides a suitable means for achieving
one’s goals regardless of the nature of those goals. However, as
Stanovich (2011) observes, this is a difﬁcult wedge to drive home
given that the standard justiﬁcation for the laws of subjective prob-
ability are given by the Dutch book theorem (Vineberg, 2011). For
each of the laws of probability theory, this theorem establishes
that violating themwould leave an agent open tomaking bets they
cannot win. The converse Dutch book theorem then establishes
that these laws are instrumentally rational because conforming
to them prevents taking self-defeating actions. This instrumen-
tally rational justiﬁcation can then be provided with a directively
rational formulation: if an agent wishes to avoid making bets they
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cannot win, then they should conform to the laws of probability the-
ory. This conditional formulation just restates the converse Dutch
book theorem. So this formulation involves making conformity
to the normative theory conditional on that normative theory’s
rational justiﬁcation. The justiﬁcation for probability theory is
instrumental [other epistemic justiﬁcations, based onmaximizing
accuracy, are equally instrumental (Joyce, 1998)]. So, in the case of
probability theory there is simply no wedge to be driven between
instrumental and normative rationality1.
This formulation also raises the question of how universal are
the goals stated in the antecedent? In a conditional formulation
the more universal an antecedent the less it needs to be stated.
So, for example we would normally say ripe apples fall. We do
not feel compelled to formulate this as if gravity is in force ripe
apples fall. One could even use an appropriate modal, ripe apples
ought to fall. Certainly one might be inclined to query whether
this is a real or a good apple if it did not fall, which is perilously
close to an evaluative judgment. Similarly, the more universal we
regard the wish to avoid making bets one is bound to lose, the
more inclined we would be to drop the conditional formulation
and evaluate anyone not conforming to the rules of probability
as irrational just as we may be inclined to evaluate the apple as
inedible. If we encountered someone willing to make bets they
were bound to lose, they would probably be institutionalized for
their own safety. As with instrumental and normative rationality,
the barrier between directive and evaluative rationality seems per-
meable. Moreover, the fundamental issue is of universality versus
relativity. The theory is normatively rational if its justiﬁcation is
considered universal.
The inference to which Elqayam and Evans (2011) seem to
take exception is the claim that as theoreticians we should accept
the theory that makes the most rational sense of the participants’
behavior (Oaksford and Chater, 1996, 2007). As long as we are
comparing the rules of normative theories, this will mean that the
one that best describes participants’ behavior is the one that makes
most rational sense of it. This thesis derives from the fact that in
interpreting empirical data, i.e., our participants’ behavior, we are
in exactly the same position as the radical interpreter in David-
son’s (1984, 2004) theory of ascribing intentional content. The
difference is that as reasoning researchers we may have more than
one normative theory in mind, whereas in radical interpretation
one imputes one’s own norms to one’s interlocutor. However, the
general principle remains the same: we are trying to make the best
sense of what we have been told.
INTERPRETATION, ARGUMENTATION, AND RATIONALITY
Davidson’s model of radical interpretation is an idealized account
of howa cognitive agent can interpret another agent’s behavior and
utterances to infer their beliefs and desires (Rescorla, 2013). The
model is based on Bayesian decision theory, in which beliefs are
graded and related to subjective probabilities and people’s desires
1We note also that the justiﬁcation for selecting data in accordance with Oaksford
and Chater’s (1994) information gain model is again instrumental. So following its
dictates will mean that this strategy minimizes the length of the sequential sample
needed for the posteriors to converge on the true hypothesis (Fedorov, 1972). This
is an instrumental justiﬁcation: if people want to get to the truth in the most
economical way they will select data in accordance with the theory.
are represented as utilities. Savage’s (1954) axioms show that when
a person’s preferences meet certain requirements there are proba-
bilities and utilities that guarantee that their preferences maximize
expected utility. Consequently, an agent’s beliefs and desires can
be inferred from their overt preferences. An important wrinkle is
that the propositional content of beliefs are not pre-speciﬁed but
are also inferred from an interlocutor’s preferences for the truth
of sentences. Central to this account is the thesis that to ascribe
another person with the appropriate beliefs and desires means we
must assume they conform to our own standards of rationality.
This is the principle of charity. As Davidson (2005; p. 319, cited
in, Rescorla, 2013) puts it: “Charity is a matter of ﬁnding enough
rationality in those we would understand to make sense of what
they say anddo, for unlesswe succeed in this,we cannot identify the
contents of their words and thoughts.” Rationality is constitutive
of having intentional states.
This is an idealized model but the central idea that we must
attribute to others similar rational norms to ourselves in order to
interpret them is intended as a more general claim about inter-
pretation in the real world that involves attributing others with
propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires. OnDavidson’s view
describing somebody’s behavior in terms of beliefs and desires is
inseparable from normative evaluation.
Davidson’s (2004) emphasis on interpretive communicative
processes proposes a particular research methodology which has
been pursued recently in the context of human argumentation
(Oaksford and Hahn, 2004, 2013; Hahn and Oaksford, 2007).
Argumentation is a social phenomenon in which one or more
people attempt to persuade another person or group of a par-
ticular, often controversial, position. It is a commonplace of
argumentation theory that arguing is pointless unless there is
broad agreement between the protagonists on what could count
as a reasonable argument (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969;
Woods et al., 2004). Without this point of departure there is no
point in engaging in an argumentative exchange. At least ini-
tially, we must apply the principle of charity2. Recently it has
been argued that reasoning usually has an argumentative goal
(Hahn and Oaksford, 2007; Mercier and Sperber, 2011). Con-
sequently, it is in social argumentative contexts where people’s
rational norms of reasoning would be expected to be most in evi-
dence. It is a critical ability to be able to evaluate the arguments
put forward by others to persuade you or your friends of particular
positions.
Recent research in this area has adopted a third person argu-
ment evaluation methodology (Oaksford and Hahn, 2004, 2013;
Hahn and Oaksford, 2007; Harris et al., 2012). Participants are
explicitly asked to assess the degree to which one interlocutor,
A, should be convinced by an argument put forward by another
interlocutor, B. So, participants are explicitly asked for an evalua-
tive judgment. They are also provided with information about A’s
prior degree of belief in the conclusion. Hahn andOaksford (2006,
2007), Oaksford and Hahn (2004, 2013) have provided normative
Bayesian analyses of a variety of different forms of argumentation
2After an initial exchange, we may discover that we are not in a critical discussion,
i.e., a rational exchange of arguments intended to persuade, but rather are in a
quarrel, where rationality goes out the window.
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which make clear predictions for participants’ judgments. In this
context, a normative Bayesian account provides excellent ﬁts to
the data. Moreover, this is true even when there are no parameters
free to vary (Harris et al., 2012) because participants have been
asked for their judgments of the relevant likelihoods from which
predictions for their posteriors can be directly computed (see also,
Fernbach and Erb, 2013). These results demonstrate that when
participants are asked for an evaluative judgment of other peo-
ples’ arguments they reveal behavior that is closely in accordance
with the appropriate normative theory. This is not only because
they have been asked directly to make an evaluative judgment.
They are also explicitly provided with A’s prior degree of belief,
which absolves them from the dilemma of considering whether
they would believe the conclusion prior to hearing the argument.
They are simply told that, for whatever reason, A believes it to a
certain degree. In ﬁrst person paradigms, participants are asked
to assume or suppose that they believe the premises to be true
or to a certain degree, when of course they may believe no such
thing.
In summary, the psychology of reasoning will have to deal with
evaluative normativity becausemuchhumanbehavior involves the
explicit evaluation of others’ arguments, especially in politics, and
in the law. Moreover, participants in experiments on argumen-
tation make these evaluations naturally and their performance
reveals direct sensitivity to appropriate rational norms.
HOW MANY RATIONAL NORMS ARE THERE?
I conclude this paper by addressing two critical issues underlying
Elqayam and Evans (2011) criticisms of evaluative normativity, (i)
deciding between normative theories and (ii) the conviction that
constructs like the principle of charity collapse into relativism.
On Davidson’s (2004) ideal model there are no alternative nor-
mative frameworks. Basic logic, probability theory, and decision
theory [see, Chater and Oaksford (2012) on the role of these the-
ories in cognitive science] are fundamental rational norms and
he broaches no other possibilities. This raises the question, of
how many rational norms are there actually to choose between?
A prima facie argument can be made that that there are not as
many as one might think. Elqayam and Evans (2011) suggest
that the new Bayesian paradigm is an alternative norm account.
I argue that since probability theory presupposes standard logic
they are not really in competition. A derived theorem of the Kol-
mogorov axioms is logical consequence, i.e., if X logically entails Y,
then Pr(Y ) ≥ Pr(X), which “ensures that probabilistic reasoning
respects deductive logic” (Joyce, 2004, p. 135). The question is
not whether one norm supplants another but whether beliefs are
graded. Once we opt for graded beliefs, then we need to know
how they are updated in inference when new information comes
in. This can be achieved by Bayesian conditionalization rather
than modus ponens (Oaksford, in press; Oaksford and Chater,
2007, 2013), although this is not necessary because probabilis-
tic premises will deductively entail a probability interval for the
conclusions of an argument (Pfeifer and Kleiter, 2010). Con-
sequently, I suggest that the move to Bayesian probability is
not a move to an alternative norm rather than a move to a
ﬁner grained analysis of beliefs which is not just binary true or
false.
Thus, when comparing logic and probability, we are not
choosing between competing norms. Davidson would argue, and
common sense seems to dictate, that if the more nuanced view
provides a rational understanding of more of the data it is the pre-
ferred theory. When the issue of competing norms is taken out of
the equation this is simply the question of which theory provides
the best description of the data. What happens if there are gen-
uinely competing normative theories that are equally descriptively
adequate?
For example, in decision theory an explicit competitor to clas-
sical Bayesian probability theory has been provided by quantum
probability (Pothos and Busemeyer, 2013). This would appear to
be much closer to the competing norms case that Elqayam and
Evans (2011) envisage. Quantum probability stands to quantum
logic – in which the law of the excluded middle is not valid – as
Bayesian probability stands to standard logic (Oaksford, 2013).
Moreover, across a variety of tasks, Pothos and Busemeyer (2013)
argue that quantum probability is more descriptively adequate
than Bayesian probability theory. Recall that the formulation for
directive normativity is conditional, with the relevant justiﬁca-
tion for the normative theory in the antecedent. For Bayesian
probability theory we have, if an agent wishes to avoid mak-
ing bets they cannot win, then they should conform to the laws
of probability theory. For quantum probability, however, there
does not appear to be a relevant justiﬁcatory antecedent. There
would appear to be no Dutch book theorem showing that fail-
ure to conform to the laws of quantum probability would lead
anyone to make bets they could not win3. Moreover, confor-
mity to the laws of quantum probability may well lead to a
Dutch book being made against you. For example, it has been
shown that committing the conjunction fallacy (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1983) can allow a Dutch book to be made against
you (Gilio and Over, 2012; Hahn, 2014) and quantum prob-
ability apparently predicts the conjunction fallacy (Pothos and
Busemeyer, 2013). Consequently, however descriptively adequate
with respect to the data quantum probability appears to be, it
cannot explain how behavior succeeds in the real macroscopic
world which we inhabit. Even if we can make sense of lay-
ing bets on the outcomes of quantum events, there would still
need to be an independent argument that there are similar events
about which we could gamble at the macroscopic level (Oaksford,
2013).
Elqayam and Evans (2011) argue against the principle of char-
ity solely on the observation that norms are relative to particular
cultural and historical contexts. However, they do not discuss
Davidson’s view of rationality as a constitutive norm (Rescorla,
2013). On Davidson’s view conformity to these norms is constitu-
tive of having intentional states and is not relative to any particular
cultural or historical context. As there are no human beings to
whom we would not attribute beliefs this suggests that our norms
are also universal. The Dutch book theorems certainly have this
character. Gambling is a universal human activity, engaged in by
3Although in physics, there are arguments that a Bayesian approach, i.e., probability
as a measure of ignorance, might make sense of quantum probability as a theory of
rational betting in quantum gambles (Pitowsky, 2003). One then has to ask whether
there is any analog of a quantum gamble at the macroscopic level that any human
being would be concerned to win.
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all cultures and in all historical contexts. Moreover, it seems incon-
ceivable that anyone would fail to accede to the rationale for the
Dutch book theorems, what normal human being would wish to
make bets they are bound to lose? In the ﬁrst section, I argued
that the permeability between directive and evaluative rationality
depends on the universality of the justiﬁcation for a normative
system. So we have good grounds to view probability theory as a
universal evaluative norm.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, in the psychology of reasoning, interpreting experi-
mental results, just as in interpreting another’s utterances, requires
making the best rational sense of the observed behavior. People
evaluate each other’s arguments in politics and in the law and in
appropriate argumentative contexts their judgments conform to
the rational norms of probability theory. The current Bayesian
turn in the psychology of reasoning addresses the question of
whether beliefs are graded and is not an alternative norm to stan-
dard logic. From Davidson’s perspective, the universal attribution
of beliefs to others has the corollary that our rational norms are
likely to be similarly universal. Elqayam and Evans (2011) pro-
vide no grounds to question this perspective. However, there are
many exceptions, data that does not conform to these norms (e.g.,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; but see, Crupi et al., 2008), cases
of irrationality due to illness or injury, cases where sacred values
are opposed to utility maximization (Atran and Axelrod, 2008),
and other paradoxes of maximizing expected utility (Burns and
Wieth, 2004; but see Turner and Quilter, 2014). However, there
are responses to these exceptions as some of the citations indi-
cate. In sum, the union of evaluative normativity and descriptive
psychology, implicit in Davidson (Rescorla, 2013), is continuing
to yield important results and this should be regarded as a good
thing.
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